No algorithm decrypts physics.
A quantum computer breaks the cryptography your infrastructure trusts. It does not change what a power rail does. PWX moves its transport and evidence to NIST post-quantum standards, while detection keeps reading the current and the voltage it always read.
Request a readiness auditWhat Q-day breaks, and what it does not break in PWX.
A cryptographically relevant quantum computer breaks RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography: key exchange, signatures, attestation. We mapped every place PWX relies on that math. The detection itself is not one of them: a verdict is computed from current and voltage, and no algorithm decrypts physics.
- Three consequences of Shor's algorithm, each with a plan
- Grover checked: our hashes and symmetric ciphers hold
- Physical key theft through the power path: detected today
Today
Quantum-safe
A channel that survives the harvest.
Traffic recorded today can be decrypted after Q-day. The PWX channel from the agent to the edge moves to a hybrid key exchange, X25519 with ML-KEM-768, so nothing captured now opens later. The same mutual TLS, the same certificates, a different handshake. Exports to your SIEM follow where the receiving side supports it.
- FIPS 203 ML-KEM in a hybrid with X25519
- Already shipped in OpenSSL 3.5 and BoringSSL under our gRPC stack
- In on-prem and air-gapped deployments the channel never leaves the rack
SHA-256tamper-evidentFIPS 204outside PWXEvidence that outlives the math.
An incident record is only evidence if it cannot be rewritten. PWX hashes every verdict into the previous one and signs the chain head with ML-DSA at the edge, with the head anchored in your SIEM. A report an auditor opens in 2035 still verifies.
- Persistent, anchored audit chain first
- ML-DSA (FIPS 204) signatures on reports and chain heads
- Signing keys at the edge in a TPM-backed store, not in the BMC
Know if your fleet is quantum-ready.
Before you can migrate, you need an inventory. PWX reads the power path through Redfish and reports what still relies on classical public-key cryptography: BMC TLS, SPDM attestation, firmware signing where the vendor publishes it. Each finding is mapped to the CNSA 2.0 and NIST transition dates your auditors use.
- BMC TLS groups and SPDM algorithms, read-only, no agent
- Firmware signature algorithms from vendor data, flagged where unknown
- CNSA 2.0 (2027, 2030) and NIST IR 8547 (2030, 2035) timelines
New math, same power.
Post-quantum algorithms move the weak point from the mathematics to the implementation. Lattice signatures are documented targets of fault attacks, and the usual way to induce a fault is a glitch on the supply rail. The rail is what PWX measures, a hundred times a second, whatever algorithm is running on it.
- Voltage faults detected at the rail in 20 ms on the bench
- Works for ML-DSA and ML-KEM implementations as it does for RSA today
- Prevention at the rail, write-protect and PWX-06, on the roadmap
- ✓Detection logic never depended on public-key cryptographyTODAY
- ✓Transport and evidence move to NIST post-quantum standardsROADMAP
- ✓Quantum-readiness audit of the power path, agentlessPILOT
- ✓Hashes and symmetric ciphers reviewed against GroverCHECKED
- ✕PWX does not run on, protect, or use a quantum computerNOT CLAIMED
- ✕Quantum key distribution, quantum random numbersNOT OURS
Quantum-safe means exactly this.
PWX is not a quantum product. It is a power-layer security platform whose cryptography is moving to NIST post-quantum standards, and whose detection never depended on the cryptography a quantum computer breaks. We say what is done, what is planned, and what is not ours.
- Done: the review, and detection that reads physics
- Planned: hybrid channel, signed evidence, readiness audit
- Not ours: quantum computers, QKD, quantum randomness